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Abstract
Between 1962 and 1973, thousands of refugees crossed
from the Indonesian-controlled western half of the island
of New Guinea into the Australian-controlled eastern
half. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) refrained from becoming involved in the
issue, and from publicly criticizing the Australian govern-
ment over its response to West Papuan asylum seekers. In
return, the Australian government committed itself to
keeping the High Commissioner informed about develop-
ments in New Guinea on the understanding that it would
provide information on a strictly confidential basis. The
article explores the High Commissioner’s possible motives
for effectively condoning Australia’s refugee policies in
Papua and New Guinea. It demonstrates the relevance of
this historical case study for our understanding of current
Australian policies and for evaluating the relationship be-
tween the UNHCR and governments.
Résumé
Entre 1962 et 1973, des milliers de réfugiés sont passés de
la moitié occidentale de l’île de la Nouvelle-Guinée, con-
trôlée par l’Indonésie, à la moitié orientale, sous contrôle
australien. Le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies
pour les réfugiés (HCNUR) s’est abstenu de s’impliquer
dans le problème et de critiquer publiquement le gouver-
nement australien pour sa réponse aux demandeurs
d’asile de la Papouasie de l’Ouest. En échange, le gouver-
nement australien s’est engagé à informer le Haut Com-
missaire sur l’évolution en Nouvelle-Guinée à condition
que celui-ci fournisse des renseignements de manière
strictement confidentielle. L’article s’attarde aux motifs
possibles du Haut Commissaire pour avoir efficacement
toléré les politiques de l’Australie en matière de réfugiés
en Papouasie et en Nouvelle-Guinée. Il démontre la perti-
nence de cette étude de cas historique pour notre compré-
hension des politiques australiennes actuelles et pour
l’évaluation de la relation entre le HCNUR et le gouver-
nement.
T
he involvement of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the provision of
humanitarian assistance during the Kosovo conflict
demonstrated that the UNHCR, much like other interna-
tional organizations, has not been as non-political as it has
frequently claimed (and as its statute stipulates).1 Gil Loes-
cher’s magisterial history of the organization shows that its
partiality in 1999 had precedents, and that since its inception
in the early 1950s, its approach to refugee crises had regularly
been influenced by the interests of governments.2 The
UNHCR’s funding comes almost entirely from voluntary
contributions made by individual states, and, as Loescher
has pointed out, “[g]overnments exert leverage on the office
by earmarking funds for programmes that are of particular
political interest to them.”3 The dependence on the good-
will—and, indeed, the vested interests—of individual gov-
ernments is further exacerbated by the fact that the
UNHCR’s major donors comprise only a small proportion
of the UN’s member states.
While the dependence of international organizations on
member governments—and, in particular, those of their
principal donors—has been widely acknowledged, little
attention has been paid to the minutiae of the relationship
between international organizations and member govern-
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ments. So far, no study has been published that investigates
in detail the dynamics of the relationship between the
UNHCR and a national government. In this article I explore
a key chapter in the relations between the UNHCR and
Australia. Drawing on Australian government files and
UNHCR archival records, I demonstrate how the organiza-
tion’s role in providing, and lobbying for, protection for
refugees was compromised by its consideration for Austra-
lia’s interests.
Australia has long claimed to be among the organiza-
tion’s staunchest supporters. It has been a regular financial
contributor, has been one of only a handful of countries
offering long-term resettlement solutions, was a long-time
member of the UNHCR executive committee, and was one
of the first countries to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention.
In recent years it has often been pointed out that the rela-
tions between Australia and the United Nations in general,
and the UNHCR in particular, have been strained since at
least the turn of the century, if not since the election of the
Howard government in 1996.4 I do not doubt this claim,
but would like to question the assumption usually under-
lying it, namely, that before 1996, Australia was a model
member of the United Nations and that the Australian
government wholeheartedly embraced the principles guid-
ing the work of the High Commissioner for Refugees.
In the following, I analyze the policies and perceptions
of both the Australian government and the High Commis-
sioner and his staff concerning West Papuans seeking Aus-
tralia’s protection in Papua and New Guinea between 1962
and 1973. References to either the prominence of Austra-
lia’s geopolitical role or the size of the West Papuan refugee
flow may be insufficient to warrant this case study. But
while providing an in-depth analysis of negotiations that
were seemingly of minor importance in the context  of
Australia’s overall relationship with international organiza-
tions, and in the context of the UNHCR’s overall relation-
ship with members of the United Nations, it throws light
on wider issues, such as the subsumation of refugee policy
under foreign policy, the dependent relationship between
the UNHCR and governments, the costs and benefits of
discretion, and the High Commissioner’s role in forging
relationships with governments and in thereby shaping the
organization’s approach to particular refugee crises.
Australia and the UNHCR: The Historical
Context
Throughout the debate that led to the establishment of the
UNHCR, the Australian government was skeptical about the
role the new organization could play and disagreed strongly
with some of the sentiments reflected in the draft Conven-
tion.5 Commenting on what became Article 31, the Secretary
of the Department of Immigration, Tasman Heyes (whose
contribution to the work of the UNHCR was later to be
recognised with a Nansen medal), wrote:
This article . . . is designed to recognise a right of asylum for
persons escaping from persecution; but . . . it merely permits
unlawful entry, so long as the refugee presents himself without
delay to the authorities and ‘shows good cause’ for his illegal
entry. This is obviously designed to meet conditions in Europe
where there are frontiers across which a refugee may escape. It
would hardly accord with Australia’s immigration policy if the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were to be ranked as frontiers across
which asylum should be sought.6
Although initially opposed to the idea of putting the draft
Refugee Convention to a special conference of plenipoten-
tiaries, Australia was one of twenty-five countries repre-
sented at the Geneva conference of July 1951.7 The
Australian delegation was careful not to highlight Austra-
lia’s objections, but it was comparatively isolated on ac-
count of its opposition to key elements of the draft
Convention. Of those represented at the conference, only
the United States had as many misgivings about the draft
Convention as Australia.
Believing that the Refugee Convention would interfere
with their countries’ respective immigration laws and sus-
picious of the newly created international agency, the Aus-
tralian and United States governments were instrumental
in establishing the Intergovernmental Committee for Euro-
pean Migration (ICEM), thereby duplicating some of the
UNHCR’s functions. During the 1950s and 1960s, Australia
admitted more refugees for resettlement through the ICEM
than through the UNHCR.
Australia acceded to the Refugee Convention in 1954.
The Department of Immigration had dropped many of its
initial objections when, much to the surprise of the Austra-
lian delegation to the 1951 Geneva conference, contracting
states were allowed to opt against making the Convention
universally applicable. Australia nevertheless recorded res-
ervations regarding six of the Convention’s articles.
Initially, the Australian government dealt with the
UNHCR through its permanent mission in Geneva. While
the UNHCR nominated refugees for resettlement, it did not
supervise their resettlement in Australia. From 1956, the
UNHCR was represented in Australia by an Australian,
Brigadier Frank Field, albeit on a part-time and largely
honorary basis.8 He seems to have concerned himself
mainly with fund-raising activities; the Australian govern-
ment, which had been skeptical about the benefits of his
appointment, would clearly not have wanted him to moni-
tor its resettlement efforts.
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When Field announced his retirement in 1958, the High
Commissioner used the opportunity to propose the estab-
lishment of an Australian branch office staffed by a full-
time UNHCR representative.9 The High Commissioner
wanted his representative to be “responsible for liaison with
Government authorities, the coordination of voluntary
agencies’ activities in the field of refugee re-settlement and
fund raising activities in Australia and New Zealand.”10
Australia’s Departments of External Affairs and Immigra-
tion had little interest in the establishment of such an office,
which they seemed to regard as an attempt to meddle in
Australia’s affairs.11 Australia’s Minister for External Af-
fairs, Richard Casey, noted with regard to the UNHCR’s
proposal: “This seems overdoing it—but I suppose it is
their affair and not  ours—and we can do nothing but
agree.”12 In April 1959, the U.S. national Alexander McIver
became the first full-time UNHCR representative in Aus-
tralia.
Within the context of the international refugee regime at
the time, Australia was of crucial importance as a final desti-
nation for many European refugees. Ordinarily, refugees
were resettled in Australia after they had been nominated by
the UNHCR or the ICEM and then selected by Australian
immigration officers. But from at least 1954, when a Soviet
diplomat and his wife defected and formally sought Austra-
lia’s protection, Australia had also dealt with asylum seekers.
During  the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, dozens of
athletes requested political asylum in Australia. In the late
1950s and early 1960s, ship jumpers and stowaways from
Eastern European countries and from China, and three Por-
tuguese naval deserters, similarly sought asylum in Australia.
Since 1956, Australia had an asylum-seeker policy, according
to which the Departments of External Affairs and Immigra-
tion and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO) assessed requests for asylum.13
The number of people seeking asylum in Australia dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s was comparatively small. Austra-
lia’s geographical position seemed to ensure that it would
never play a significant role as a country of first asylum.
Australia itself is—in the words of its national anthem—a
country “girth by sea.” But until  1975, Australia was  a
colonial power, and its largest colony and closest neigh-
bour,  the then  Australian  Territory of  Papua and New
Guinea, shared a land border with first the Dutch colony of
West New Guinea, and then Indonesia. In 1962, the Dutch
were pressured into withdrawing from New Guinea and
effectively surrendered the last remnant of their former
Southeast Asian empire to Indonesia. Over the following
years, a small but constant trickle of refugees moved across
the partly unmarked border into the Australian territory.
Between 1962 and 1973, several thousand refugees from the
Indonesian-controlled western half of the island of New
Guinea crossed into Papua and New Guinea.14
In terms of the contacts between the UNHCR and Aus-
tralia over these refugees, it is possible to distinguish four
phases in this period, which are demarcated by:
• the Dutch withdrawal from West New Guinea in Oc-
tober 1962;
• the first evidence of the UNHCR’s interest in the issue
of West Papuan refugees in January 1965;
• the appointment of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as
High Commissioner for Refugees in December 1965;
• the election of a federal Labor government in Australia
in December 1972; and
• self-government for Papua New Guinea in December
1973.
Of No Concern to the UNHCR (October
1962—December 1964)
Even before the Dutch and Indonesian governments agreed
on the terms under which the Dutch would leave their last
Southeast Asian colony, the Australian government became
deeply concerned about the prospect of refugees fleeing
from West New Guinea to Papua  and New Guinea. In
August 1962, Cabinet considered a submission by the De-
partment of External Affairs, which warned of such an in-
flux.15 That same month, Australia’s Minister for External
Affairs, Garfield Barwick, twice referred in Parliament to the
prospect that an Indonesian takeover of West New Guinea
would result in requests for political asylum.16 In January
1963, he summoned the Indonesian ambassador to let him
know that he was “greatly concerned by the Papuans who
were presenting themselves at the border in considerable
numbers—some complaining of ill-treatment by Indone-
sian officials—others merely apprehensive because of what
they had heard of Indonesian conduct.”17
But despite its concerns about the potential and actual
influx of refugees to Papua and New Guinea, the Australian
government did then neither brief nor consult the UNHCR.
Although during the early 1960s, the UNHCR was widening
the scope of its activities by extending the concept of good
offices,18 it did not seek information from Australia about its
handling of the refugee issue in Papua and New Guinea.
In May and June 1963—just after West New Guinea’s
United Nations interim administration had been replaced
by an Indonesian administration—the High Commis-
sioner, Felix Schnyder, made an official visit to Australia.
He met the Prime Minister, the Secretary of the Department
of External Affairs, and other high-ranking government
officials. There is no indication in the archival record that
Schnyder raised the issue of West Papuan refugees with the
Australian government. It may, of course, be that he was
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simply unaware of the problem. (His staff had not briefed
him about it ahead of the visit.)19
There is no indication either to suggest that the Australians
briefed Schnyder about the West Papuan issue. Australia
could have argued that it was under no legal obligation to
treat West Papuan asylum seekers as potential Convention
refugees. It had signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, but, as
mentioned earlier, with the caveat that it only applied to
people who had become refugees as a result of events occur-
ring in Europe before 1951. But it had never denied its moral
obligation to grant asylum to what it considered to be genuine
political refugees,20 and—despite its preference for dealing
with the ICEM—never questioned the validity of the
UNHCR’s mandate, which did not single out a particular
class of refugees on the basis of when and where the events
occasioning their displacement had occurred.
The UNHCR Becomes Involved (January
1965—November 1965)
On 11 January 1965, the UNHCR’s representative for Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, Alexander McIver, sent a cutting
from Sydney’s Daily Telegraph about Indonesian repression
in West Irian to Paul Weis, the UNHCR’s Geneva-based
legal adviser, seeking his comments “on the position of the
Branch Office and the legal status of the refugees, assuming
that a major refugee problem did develop in this immediate
area.”21 Until then, McIver had shown no obvious interest
in issues of political asylum generally or in the refugee flow
into Papua and New Guinea in particular, although he must
have been aware of the latter. His letter was not prompted
by the newspaper article (as there had been numerous pre-
vious references in the Australian press to the situation in
West Irian) but most likely was instigated by his designated
successor, Victor Beerman, a Dutch diplomat who already
represented UNICEF and other UN organizations in Aus-
tralia and who would add McIver’s role to his responsibili-
ties after McIver’s retirement at the end of June 1965 (which
effectively meant that the UNHCR scaled down its presence
in Australia).
Weis replied that while the 1951 Convention did not
apply to West Papuans crossing into the Territory of Papua
and New Guinea (because of Australia’s reservations), these
refugees could be regarded as coming within the High
Commissioner’s mandate. He also pointed out: “The prin-
ciple of non-refoulement, i.e. that no bona fide refugee
should be returned against his will to a country where he
fears persecution, should apply regardless of the Conven-
tion status of the persons concerned.” Weis suggested that
McIver discuss the matter with the Australian authorities.22
McIver (probably again nudged by Beerman) did not
await Weis’s reply.  On 2  March  1965, he wrote to the
Department of External Affairs to enquire what the Minis-
ter for Territories had meant when, in a newspaper inter-
view, he had emphasized the “need to recognise
international Conventions.” Did he perhaps refer to the
1951 Refugee Convention?23
Not having received a reply from the Australian authori-
ties, but now in possession of Weis’s reply, McIver followed
up his first letter to External Affairs with another two weeks
later. Pretending that Weis’s interest had been sparked by
an article in a London newspaper (rather than by his own
letter), McIver quoted Weis’s comments about the UNHCR
mandate and refoulement.24 Australian officials were anx-
ious to reassure the UNHCR. In reply to McIver’s first
query, External Affairs Assistant Secretary Bob Furlonger,
who had just returned from a posting as Australia’s Con-
sul-General in Geneva, said that the Minister for Territories
had referred to conventions “only in the sense of ‘accepted
international practices’ and had no specific International
Convention in mind.” He also acquainted McIver with the
government’s official line on West Papuan border crossers:
There is at present no refugee problem in New Guinea. Indeed,
the word “refugee” is largely inapplicable to the kind of cross
border movement that has taken place between West Irian and
the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Those persons who
have come across the border have in most cases been resident
in the border area, with many of them having tribal connections
and tribal lands extending across the border into Papua/New
Guinea. Papuans in other categories have in nearly all cases
agreed to return to West Irian after discussing their situation
with officials of our Administration. Over the last year, only one
of these cases involved a request by a Papuan for entry on
political grounds.25
This representation of the situation, which reflected the
official government position that Indonesia could be trusted
to safeguard the rights of West Papuans and that they had
therefore no reason to flee,26 was patently untrue as, in the
preceding two-and-a-half years, many people had fled Indo-
nesian-controlled West Irian because they had reason to fear
for their safety. Some of them, whose claims to have been
persecuted or to fear being persecuted had been supported
by the Dutch government, had been allowed to remain in
the Australian territory.
On the day he replied to McIver, Furlonger also con-
tacted Australia’s representative in Geneva, Brian Hill:
I have no need to labour the question of the delicacy of our
relationship with Indonesia in New Guinea and the problems
which would be created for us by any ill-considered action,
particularly if taken publicly, by the High Commissioner’s Of-
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fice. . . . It is important that UNHCR appreciate the problems
arising  from our  unique  position as  a country of Western
European background living alongside an Asian country—and
a particularly turbulent one at that.27
Furlonger’s advice could be read as a suggestion that Hill
appeal to the High Commissioner and his senior staff (who,
with the exception of Schnyder’s deputy, Prince Sadruddin
Aga Khan, were all of European background) to extend their
solidarity as Europeans to the far-flung European outpost in
the South Pacific.
Furlonger asked Hill to speak to Schnyder and to
Thomas Jamieson, the UNHCR’s Director of Operations,
about “the refugee question in New Guinea”:
[W]e expect that no action would be contemplated by the High
Commissioner’s Office—even in the form  of references  in
UNHCR documents—without the closest consultation with us.
I think that Schnyder and Jamieson would appreciate the force
of this view; what needs also to be avoided is that people like
Weis, who may not realise the political sensitivity of the matter,
may take seemingly routine action at a lower level which could
be just as embarrassing as action taken with the full knowledge
of senior UNHCR people.28
Jamieson promised Hill to ensure that there were no refer-
ences to West Papuan refugees in UNHCR documents and
that “officers down the line knew the position.”29 Jamieson,
and possibly Schnyder, were easily cajoled into agreeing to
the Australian demands.
It seems to have been at least partly Victor Beerman’s
achievement that the High Commissioner was nevertheless
unable to ignore the refugee issue in New Guinea. In Sep-
tember 1965, Beerman, who had been told by a Foreign
Affairs official that the Australian government wanted to
“discourage any interest by the U.N.H.C.R. in this mat-
ter,”30 but who was apparently unaware of the agreement
between Jamieson and Hill, wrote a lengthy memorandum
about the refugee issue in New Guinea. His findings must
have alarmed his superiors in Geneva. He reported that the
Department of Territories “is not burdened by any specific
knowledge of the 1951 Convention” and that the Australian
government had “no experience with any eligibility proce-
dure for refugees arriving on their territory and asking for
(first) asylum.” He suspected that the Australian authorities
ignored a key principle of international refugee law: “With
few exceptions, one gets the impression that refoulement is
the general line of conduct followed by the local admini-
stration.” But he also warned: “the matter has to be handled
with the greatest caution; there is no doubt that Canberra
rather prefers to hush-hush the whole matter not wanting
to further deteriorate its already so difficult relationship
with the Indonesia of President Sukarno.”31
Schnyder adopted one of Beerman’s recommendations,
namely, to provide the Australian authorities with an “un-
official demarche” offering the UNHCR’s assistance and
outlining its position.32 On 23 November 1965, Schnyder
called in Hill and gave him a typed, unsigned note, which
Beerman had helped to draft. By handing Hill an informal
note rather than a signed letter to the Australian govern-
ment under the UNHCR letterhead, Schnyder indicated
that he was trying to bend over backwards to accommodate
Australian sensitivities. He assured Hill that his approach
had not been “prompted by his having received informa-
tion in any way critical of the Australian Governments [sic]
action” in relation to border crossers, and that “any infor-
mation [the Australian government] might give him would
be treated as entirely confidential, that it would not be
distributed either within or outside his headquarters.”33 In
the note, the High Commissioner told the Australians that
they need not be afraid of involving the UNHCR:
UNHCR would greatly appreciate the receipt of information on
the procedures applied to persons belonging to the group in
question seeking asylum in the Territory. Such information, as
well as information relevant to the number of persons who have
sought and who have been granted asylum, would be treated by
UNHCR as of a confidential nature to the extent that such
treatment would be considered necessary by the Australian
Government.34
The note did not request the UNHCR’s involvement in the
refugee determination process, nor a visit by a UNHCR
envoy to the Territory.
Sadruddin’s Diplomacy (December
1965—November 1972)
By the time the Australians had agreed on a response to the
High Commissioner’s request, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan
had succeeded Schnyder. In January 1966, Hill formally
briefed the new High Commissioner, repeating the Austra-
lian line that the great majority of the border crossers “in no
sense can be regarded as refugees.”35 Sadruddin assented to
treating all information provided by the Australian govern-
ment about the refugee issue in New Guinea as confidential,
but was more assertive than his predecessor. He told Hill
that “while he had no reason to complain in respect of any
decisions taken so far by the authorities in Papua and New
Guinea, it was his responsibility to ensure that the cases of
asylum seekers were given full consideration.”36
In order to meet his responsibility, Sadruddin repeatedly
requested Australia’s permission for a visit of a senior
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UNHCR emissary to Papua and New Guinea to allow the
UNHCR to arrive at an independent assessment of the situ-
ation. He tried to convince the Australians of the benefits they
would gain by allowing him to corroborate the information
they provided to him, saying that under the present arrange-
ments “he had no way of adequately assuring other people
that Australia was behaving properly.”37 A visit by an
UNHCR envoy, however, was anathema to the Australian
and Indonesian governments. In fact, Sadruddin found it
difficult to arrange a visit by the UNHCR legal adviser to
Australia to discuss the refugee problem in New Guinea.
Sadruddin also repeatedly offered to assist the Austra-
lians in determining whether or not a border crosser could
be regarded a mandate refugee, but the Australian govern-
ment was unwilling to consider any proposals that would
have amounted to a direct UNHCR involvement in Papua
and New Guinea. Aiming to “create an atmosphere of
humanitarian understanding . . . between the country of
origin and the country of asylum,”38 he also offered himself
as a go-between in Australia’s dealings with Indonesia,39
but Australia’s relationship with Indonesia was sufficiently
close to render such mediation unnecessary.
Sadruddin was concerned about how the Australian
authorities distinguished between border crossers who
needed to be “persuaded” to return to Indonesian territory,
and those who were granted five-year permissive residence
visas in Papua and New Guinea. He queried the fact that
decisions about whether or not border crossers were genu-
ine refugees were made by Australian patrol officers on the
spot, and that those who were not deemed to be genuine
refugees had no right of appeal.40 “If the West Irianese have
no good reason for entry, are not of intelligence interest, or
are not of political importance, they are to be told . . . that
they are contravening the immigration laws of the Territory
and are to return forthwith,” the 1969 edition of the Terri-
tory’s “Intelligence and Security Manual” stipulated.41
While those refugees who were not immediately returned
to the border had a reasonable chance of being properly
heard, decisions about whether or not somebody might
have “good reason for entry” because he or she was a
genuine refugee were made after only a cursory interview.
The Australians regularly reminded Sadruddin of the
terms of their agreement with him, namely, that the infor-
mation they provided was confidential and that the High
Commissioner was not free to act on it. While Hill and his
successor (from June 1969), Max Loveday, made these
points subtly, others were less diplomatic. In April 1967,
the acting External Affairs secretary, Laurence McIntyre,
when providing an update about the situation at the Papua
New Guinean border to Sadruddin, wrote in the covering
letter: “I trust that no action by your office will be contem-
plated without prior reference to us.”42 Here McIntyre did
not refer to a mutual understanding reached between two
equals, or, even less, make a request, but rather seemed to
remind the High Commissioner of a previous Australian
directive. But such frankness was the exception. In fact, Hill
and Loveday were able to develop a special relationship
with Sadruddin because they accorded him—at least out-
wardly—respect.43
For more than seven years, Sadruddin treated the issue
of West Papuan refugees and his communication with the
Australian authorities as highly confidential.44 On at least
two occasions, he reprimanded the UNHCR representative
in Australia for drawing the refugee problem in Papua and
New Guinea to the attention of other United Nations staff.
In July 1967, for example, the UNHCR representative in
Macao, the Australian national Bill McCoy, mentioned in
a letter to the Geneva headquarters that he had heard that
only 10 per cent of the West Papuan asylum seekers were
allowed to remain in Papua and New Guinea but that the
majority of them had a prima facie case for asylum.45 He
was told that “Headquarters is in possession of a fair
amount of information on this question,” that the matter
was highly confidential, and that it was “being dealt with
here on the highest level.”46 At the same time, Beerman,
who had been identified as the likely source of McCoy’s
insights, was rebuked for sharing information with
McCoy.47
The Australian government rejected all suggestions to go
beyond the high-level contacts with the High Commis-
sioner. It used references to the exclusivity of these contacts
to thwart Sadruddin’s attempts to resurrect the position of
a full-time UNHCR representative in Australia.48 Sadrud-
din, on the other hand, unsuccessfully tried to extract con-
cessions from the Australian government by referring to the
difficulties this exclusivity entailed. Citing reports of re-
foulement in New Guinea, for example, he told Hill that
“members of his Legal Department were pushing him to do
something officially on this matter as he would normally
do in cases where such allegations had been made pub-
licly”.49 But all he ever received in return for his discretion
were confidential briefings.
A Breakdown in Communication (December
1972—December 1973)
On 2 December 1972, the Labor Party won the Australian
elections. After twenty-three years of uninterrupted conser-
vative rule at the federal level, the election of the Whitlam
government represented a seismic shift in Australian poli-
tics. In terms of Australia’s response to West Papuan refu-
gees, two of the incoming government’s commitments were
of particular potential relevance: to granting independence
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to Papua New Guinea at the earliest opportunity, and to
signing a raft of international conventions, including the
1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
One year after the election of the Whitlam government,
Papua New Guinea was granted self-government, and West
Papuan border crossers became the responsibility of the
Papua New Guinean government. But even before then,
Australia’s response to the refugee issue in New Guinea was
informed by the idea that Australian policies ought to avoid
creating a liability for a future independent Papua New
Guinea.
Before December 1972, Sadruddin had on several occa-
sions urged the Australian government to sign the 1967
Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention. But the govern-
ment  knew that by doing so, it would have implicitely
invited the High Commissioner’s involvement in address-
ing the West Papuan refugee problem, as Article 2 of the
Protocol obliges signatories to co-operate with the Office
of the High Commissioner in the exercise of its functions
and in particular to facilitate the Office’s duty of supervising
the application of the Protocol.50 While it was in principle
in favour of signing the Protocol, the Whitlam govern-
ment’s approach did not deviate from that of its predeces-
sor. Australia signed the Protocol only on 2 December 1973,
after Papua New Guinea had become self-governing, and
then stipulated that it did not apply to Papua New Guinea.
A personnel change proved to be of more immediate
consequence for the relationship between Australia and the
UNHCR than Whitlam’s commitment to signing the 1967
Protocol. The cordial relationship that had existed between
Sadruddin and Australia’s representative in Geneva and, by
extension, the Australian foreign ministry, abruptly ended
when, following Labor’s victory, Max Loveday was replaced
by Laurence Corkery.51 Sadruddin was unimpressed when
the flow of information from the Australian mission in
Geneva to the UNHCR dried up. On 6 March 1973, he told
his deputy, Charles Mace: “Please see the Australian Am-
bassador in my absence and ask him if he has looked up my
last letter to Max Loveday and his interim reply—as prom-
ised during our meeting of 23. II. 73 . . . and ask him AGAIN
for a reply to our last demarche. Good luck!”52
While Sadruddin had been dealing with Hill and
Loveday, he had often used representations by third parties,
such as West Papuan political representatives, to elicit re-
actions from the Australian government. But he had never
substantially responded to such  representations beyond
acknowledging their receipt. That changed in early 1973.
When Sadruddin responded to a letter from Major-General
Paul Cullen,  who  represented both  the  United  Nations
Association of Australia and CARE Australia, an umbrella
organization of Australian NGOs assisting refugees, he
tried to open another channel of communication with Aus-
tralia, confiding to Cullen that the “Australian authorities
keep my Office informed from time to time on the number
of persons to whom temporary resident permits are being
granted, but this does not necessarily provide a complete
solution.”53 He also passed on Cullen’s concerns to the
Australian government; this time, rather than either trying
to elicit an Australian response or keeping the Australian
government informed of the criticism directed at its policies
in New Guinea, Sadruddin used Cullen’s letter to under-
score his own position.
How the relationship between Australia and the UNHCR
had changed became apparent when, in August 1973, Sad-
ruddin directed that the file dealing with protection issues
in Papua and New Guinea, which had been for his own and
Jacques Colmar’s eyes only, should now be made accessible
to other senior UNHCR staff.54
In 1973, the UNHCR came close to lodging a strong
formal protest against Australia’s policies in Papua and
New Guinea, after the Australian government decided to
deport several asylum seekers to Indonesia. But once more,
for the price of a comprehensive briefing the High Com-
missioner agreed to keep quiet.55 The three men concerned
were deported.
As far as its response to refugees was concerned, the
Labor government proved to be no more generous than its
conservative predecessors. Its policy in New Guinea and its
response to the UNHCR’s appeal to resettle more Asians
from Uganda belied Whitlam’s claim in December 1973
that his government had ensured that “our country has
once again assumed its rightful place in the vanguard of
countries promoting human rights.”56
Postcript
(December 1973 to September 1975)
After 1 December 1973, the UNHCR negotiated with Papua
New Guinea rather than with Australia. But the organization
tried to use Australia as an intermediary to convince the
Papua New Guinean government to sign the Refugee Con-
vention and Protocol and to allow an UNHCR emissary to
visit Papua New Guinea. As soon as Australia was no longer
directly responsible for West Papuan refugees, it agreed to
the proposed visit.57 But the government in Port Moresby
was as opposed to such a visit as the government in Canberra
had been before 1 December 1973. This time, however, the
High Commissioner’s representations were successful, and
in August 1975, for the first time, a senior UNHCR officer
was allowed to visit Papua New Guinea.58
In his relationship with the Papua New Guinean govern-
ment, Sadruddin did not observe the discretion that had
marked his relationship with the Australians, particularly
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before December 1972. In April 1975, all restrictions on the
circulation of the file dealing with West Papuan refugees in
Papua New Guinea were removed.59
Conclusion
Until the granting of self-governance to Papua New Guinea
in 1973, the Australian government successfully managed to
keep the UNHCR effectively out of Papua and New Guinea,
and to deal with the border crossers entirely on Australia’s
own terms—which were often informed by Indonesia’s
terms. Testament to Australia’s and Indonesia’s success in
keeping the UNHCR sidelined is the fact that Louise Hol-
born’s 1,500-page history of the organization (which was
initiated by Sadruddin in the late 1960s and published in
1975) does not once mention West Papuan refugees.60
Until the end of 1972, the UNHCR’s approach towards
the West Papuan refugee problem was marked by the or-
ganization’s desire to avoid, at all costs, embarrassing the
Australian government. The costs were high: by respecting
the confidentiality agreement with the Australians, the
High Commissioner could not intervene publicly on behalf
of West Papuan refugees. Indirectly, such intervention
could have made a significant impact: the Australian gov-
ernment was sensitive to criticism of its refugee policies in
the Australian and Dutch press and in the House of Assem-
bly in Port Moresby; the High Commissioner may have
been able to lend weight to this criticism.
In 1967, the UNHCR representative in Macao was
warned off from making further enquiries about West Pap-
uan refugees and told that the Geneva headquarters were
already well informed about the issue. But the information
available to the High Commissioner was at best one-sided
and often poor. None of his staff had ever visited the border
region or spoken to West Papuan refugees in Papua and
New Guinea. He had to rely on what the Australian govern-
ment chose to tell him, on newspaper articles, and on
statements from West Papuan exiles. Sadruddin became
more proactive only from 1973 onwards, when he found
that the Australian representative in Geneva could no
longer be relied on to keep him informed.
The information provided by Hill and Loveday was of
questionable value if only because it had gone through
many hands: distilled by the Administrator’s office in Port
Moresby from reports written by District Officers (which
in turn were based on reports compiled by patrol officers
and intelligence personnel), and then submitted to the
Department of Territories in Canberra, which in turn pre-
pared a summary for the use of the Department of External
Affairs. External Affairs officers, who liaised with the
UNHCR and the Indonesian government, had themselves
often only a sketchy understanding of the conditions in
Papua and New Guinea.
Sadruddin’s “privileged” access to information needs to be
seen also in the context of the substantive briefings provided
to the Indonesian government. While he was supplied with
statistics, the Indonesians were provided, for example, with
a list of names of all permissive residents in Papua and New
Guinea, and had occasional access to refugees in holdings
camps.61 But then, Sadruddin valued the information pro-
vided by the Australian government not so much because of
what it told him about the situation in New Guinea as for the
fact that it supposedly allowed him to be ahead of those
criticizing Australia’s response (and,  by implication,  the
UNHCR for not censoring that response).
David Forsythe has drawn attention to the need of or-
ganizations such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the UNHCR to rely on discretion rather
than on public criticism in accomplishing their objectives.62
Discussing the use of discretion by the ICRC, he points out
that it is “an instrumental rather than constitutive mat-
ter.”63 As such, it ought to have been employed principally
to advance the cause of persons of concern to the UNHCR.
Yet there is no evidence in the archival record that that was
the case. For Sadruddin, the personal relationship with Hill
and Loveday, which warranted his discretion, may have
become an end in itself. He argued consistently that discre-
tion was necessary to protect Australian interests, and made
comparatively few references to the interests of West Pap-
uan refugees. In fact, Sadruddin believed so strongly in the
merits of discretion that he exhorted a prominent West
Papuan exile to “be discreet in his approaches in order to
avoid embarrassing the Australian authorities vis-à-vis the
Indonesian government.”64
Schnyder and Sadruddin received little in return for their
discretion. To “mollify”65 them, the Australian government
kept them informed, but as they were unable to corroborate
the information they received, these briefings were of
doubtful value. The UNHCR’s demands—for a more trans-
parent refugee status determination procedure and for a
fact-finding mission to Papua and New Guinea—were not
met. Why, then, did the two High Commissioners agree to
the Australian government’s terms?
There is no evidence in the archival record to suggest that
Australia tried to use its clout as a resettlement country and
as a major donor to influence the UNHCR’s approach to
West Papuan refugees. Australia never intimated that it
could cut  its funding or  direct it only  towards specific
projects. (At the time, Australia made an untied contribu-
tion to the UNHCR.) But it may have been unnecessary for
the Australian representatives in Geneva to draw the
UNHCR’s attention to the support it had lent to the
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UNHCR over the years. “In proportion to its population,
Australia has led the world in accepting refugees for reset-
tlement,” Louise Holborn points out in her 1975 history of
the UNHCR.66 In the first twenty-five post-war years, only
the United States admitted more refugees for resettlement
than Australia. In comparison to the contribution Australia
made to resettling European refugees, the refugee issue in
New Guinea would have seemed comparatively minor. It
may have seemed hardly worth the risk of offending Aus-
tralian sensibilities. Arguably the High Commissioner was
as much a political realist as the Australian government,
which was anxious not to offend Indonesian sensibilities.
“In the end the fate of several hundred thousand coastal
West Papuans is unimportant compared with the friend-
ship of a Government representing 115 million people,” the
journalist Peter Hastings commented in 1968, thereby
summarizing the Australian government’s approach to
West Irian at the time.67
Sadruddin’s reluctance to push the issue of West Papuan
refugees with the Australian government seems likely to
have been shaped also by his attitude towards Indonesia.
After the toppling of the Sukarno government, and the
ensuing bloodshed and mass displacements in Indonesia,
Sadruddin had decided that the UNHCR’s intervention
would amount to interference in the domestic affairs of a
sovereign state.68 The Indonesian government was as inter-
ested as its Australian counterpart in sidelining the
UNHCR over the refugee issue in New Guinea.69 Having
been prepared to accommodate the interests of the Suharto
government in the aftermath of the coup, it made little
sense for Sadruddin to then offend Suharto by insisting on
the UNHCR’s involvement in New Guinea.
Sadruddin’s preparedness to accept  Australian assur-
ances at face value was probably also informed by his views
on West Papuans. In a briefing for Arnold Rørholt, Sadrud-
din warned  that “an  over-liberal asylum  policy”  would
create problems both for the Australian authorities and for
the UNHCR, and might not be in the interests of the
refugees themselves:
Indeed, it is unlikely that these groups can ever be resettled
elsewhere since Australia will be most reluctant to accept them
on the Australian continent and since other governments would
probably adopt the same attitude. West Irian is a very backward
area and the inhabitants are most primitive.70
In the context of Sadruddin’s briefing, this reference reads
as if he doubted that people as “primitive” as the inhabitants
of West Irian could be anything but economic migrants.
Incidentally, his assessment was shared by many officers in
the Departments of Territories and External Affairs.
Histories such as the one presented here could be of
relevance for at least two basic reasons: because they high-
light the legacies of the past and because they draw attention
to the exceptionality of the present. A close look at Austra-
lia’s approach to the UNHCR in the 1950s and 1960s sug-
gests that the skepticism with which the Australian
government now regards any UN involvement in Austra-
lian affairs has a long tradition, and that rather than being
something that developed under the Howard government,
it is something that is at least as old as the UNHCR.
But this close look could also highlight the specificity of
the current situation. While the Australian government did
not consider itself under any international legal obligation
in relation to its treatment of West Papuan asylum seekers,
it frequently claimed that it acted as if it were under such
obligation. In 1971, for example, Loveday assured the High
Commissioner “that the Australian Government, while not
a party to the Protocol of the Convention on Refugees, is
publicly committed to be guided by the principles embod-
ied in the convention and the Declaration on Political
Asylum and has consistently honoured this undertaking.”71
Given Australia’s unwillingness to sign the Protocol, such
statements were somewhat rhetorical. But the fact that they
were made nevertheless suggests that the government
wanted to appear committed to the principles enunciated
in the Protocol—both in terms of its international reputa-
tion and in order to satisfy a domestic audience. Nowadays,
the government tries to balance its interest in Australia’s
international reputation with its interest in electoral gain.
And it appears that the latter is best served by open disre-
gard for international institutions such as the UNHCR.
Nowadays, the UNHCR knows from experience that public
criticism of the government’s policies affects the amount
and nature of the funding it receives from Australia.
The current tensions between the UNHCR and the Aus-
tralian government are not only the outcome of Australia’s
refugee and asylum-seeker policies, but also of the
UNHCR’s public criticism of these policies. The Australian
government has responded with public displays of annoy-
ance to what it perceives to be interference in Australian
domestic matters. The Howard government has made as
few concessions to the UNHCR’s public criticism of Aus-
tralia’s mandatory detention policies as it did to Sadrud-
din’s discreet diplomatic efforts to institute a proper
eligibility procedure for West Papuan asylum seekers. But
the UNHCR’s public criticism has heartened the domestic
opposition to the government’s policies. David Forsythe
has pointed out that the UNHCR, unlike the ICRC, does
not appear to have “a means for reviewing . . . its practice
of discretion-publicity in the past, and hence what might
prove useful in the present or future.”72 Studies along the
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lines of the one undertaken here may contribute to a better
understanding not only of the tactical value of discretion,
but also of the comparative benefits of various strategies
open to the UNHCR in its dealings with governments.
Finally, this study demonstrates the highly political na-
ture of the UNHCR’s involvement. “My constant preoccu-
pation in this matter has been to assist the Australian
government in solving a complex humanitarian problem in
a non-political way,” Sadruddin wrote to the Australian
Prime Minister, William McMahon, in 1970.73 But the
High Commissioner’s acquiescence to Australian realpoli-
tik in return for privileged access to information could only
be termed non-political if one left the interests of West
Papuan refugees out of the equation. A non-political
UNHCR is inconceivable—as a reader of Sadruddin’s letter
to McMahon knew, who queried the above sentence in the
margin: “with political refugees seeking political asylum?”74
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